Image source: Ritholtz.com The Big Picture

All you need to focus on from his analysis is that today – at 11 am ET or so – Ritholtz’s humble take is that real-time is about learning as opposed to knowing. His list of “what we don’t know” stacks up as at least as important to understand as regards impacts on stakeholders like:

  • Bank customers – individuals, firms, public and private organizations, investors, etc., both as depositors and borrowers
  • Federal officials
  • Investors
  • Households – wage earners, individual investors, etc.

Confidence, expressed as consumer sentiment, means so much at moments like now. Meanwhile, check out the pretty hefty list of 10 things “we don’t know” that The Big Picture’s Barry Ritholtz considers essential to sorting things out, at least mechnically and policy-wise, while the issue of confidence evolves from a heightened state of nervousness through its courses toward a collective calm.

10 Unknowns About SVB:

Why did the bank have so much capital wrapped up in long dated Treasuries? Who was advising them? Bond Investing 101 is shorten your duration during a rate hiking cycle – how was this unknown to them?

Why did Peter Theil’s Founder’s Fund (and others) advise companies pull deposits out of SVB? What was the concern? What non-public information did they have beyond the publicly announced capital raise? Were there any other conflicts of interests, legal or otherwise?

How much of this is related to the hangover from the Great Financial Crisis? One aspect of the GFC was junk paper was often not marked to market on a timely basis – the banks “marked to make believe” and created a misleading picture of their solvency. We changed the rules for that. But why are we marking to market Treasury Bonds if they are “money good” at maturity? Should we carve out exceptions to the asset book marks for paper the Fed will repurchase at Par?

What was the impact of the rollback of Dodd Frank in 2018 during the Trump Admin? CEO of SVB had requested – and won – some rule changes, what was their impact? Did that have a material effect on the investment book maintained by SVB? How and in what way?

When did the San Francisco Fed learn SVB/Signature were running into problems? What access did the FRBSF have to the SVB investment book? Did they pass this info on in a timely manner to the Federal Reserve?

Could the regional FRBSF or the Fed itself have helped facilitate a capital raise without disruption? We do not know what was inown when, or

What was the role of messaging here? Did miscommunication from the bank play a role in the subsequent panic?

What was the impact of the most rapid set of rate increases in history have on this event? Was the FOMC a factor in seeing off a bank instability? Was the Fed on both sides of the instability here?

What other banks might have similar issues with their “safe” investment portfolio? What don’t the regulators know about the regionals that they should?

Who ends up owning these banks? Do they become part of a major (Chase, Bof A, Wells Fargo, Citi) or do they stay a regional? What is the purchase price? Shareholders are wiped put, but do bondholder see any capital?

More to learn. Less to know.